The Neuroethics of Poverty (Second part)

This is the second part of Martha Farah’s article on neuroscience, ethics and poverty.

Some have expressed concern that neuroscience encourages us to focus on a biologically malfunctioning system rather than a morally wrong social arrangement. One such critic likens the neuroscience of poverty to saying slavery is wrong because it affects the brain (see Farah, 2018, for a review of this and other critiques). Certainly, the neuroscience approach calls attention to biological factors, and this could have the unfortunate effect of diverting attention from structural social and economic factors.

Others have pointed to the risk of pathologizing the poor by emphasizing differences in brain function. Focusing on brain differences invites us to think of the poor as sick or damaged, which can itself cause harm through devaluation and stigma.

Yet another concern with the growing role of neuroscience in discussions of poverty policy comes from the frequently noted existence of critical periods. Although this strengthens the argument for societal investment in early life, it can encourage the abandonment of older children, teens and adults who need help.

These are all ethical concerns, in that they involve the misplacing of blame (away from social and economic inequalities), the objectification and devaluation of people (as inferior brains), and the excusing of inaction (because, why bother if you’ve missed the critical period).

But is the neuroscience of poverty intrinsically problematic from an ethical point of view? I don’t think so. The issues just raised are not logical implications of a neuroscientific view of poverty. It is more accurate to call them understandable misinterpretations. We can see where they come from – the discourse of neuroscience makes certain ideas about poverty particularly salient. But that is the result of the images, associations, and connotations that neuroscience calls up in our minds, rather than the literal scientific message. Saying that the neuroscience of poverty pathologizes the poor or denies the importance of structural factors is a little like complaining that the psychologist administering the Rorschach test is showing you dirty pictures.

Nevertheless, if certain harmful misunderstandings are predictable, then neuroscientists studying poverty do have an ethical obligation – the obligation to anticipate these misunderstandings and head them off. For example, given that neuroscience naturally focuses our attention on processes within the brain rather than structural causes in society, we should proactively remind our audiences that biological and social explanations are not mutually exclusive. If we are discussing the higher risk of depression for low SES individuals and presenting an explanation related to amygdala-prefrontal coupling, we should add that this neural phenomenon itself may be due to current and lifetime stressors rooted in social and economic disadvantage. For me, this was one of the most useful insights gained at this stimulating conference.