Inter-American Development Bank
facebook
twitter
youtube
linkedin
instagram
Abierto al públicoBeyond BordersCaribbean Development TrendsCiudades SosteniblesEnergía para el FuturoEnfoque EducaciónFactor TrabajoGente SaludableGestión fiscalGobernarteIdeas MatterIdeas que CuentanIdeaçãoImpactoIndustrias CreativasLa Maleta AbiertaMoviliblogMás Allá de las FronterasNegocios SosteniblesPrimeros PasosPuntos sobre la iSeguridad CiudadanaSostenibilidadVolvamos a la fuente¿Y si hablamos de igualdad?Home
Citizen Security and Justice Creative Industries Development Effectiveness Early Childhood Development Education Energy Envirnment. Climate Change and Safeguards Fiscal policy and management Gender and Diversity Health Labor and pensions Open Knowledge Public management Science, Technology and Innovation  Trade and Regional Integration Urban Development and Housing Water and Sanitation
  • Skip to main content
  • Skip to secondary menu
  • Skip to primary sidebar
  • Skip to footer

Gestión fiscal

  • HOME
  • CATEGORIES
    • Decentralization
    • Public Spending
    • Taxes
  • authors
  • Publications
  • English
    • Español

Now it is the time to Foster Labor Formalization in Latin America and the Caribbean

March 15, 2021 by Carola Pessino - Emilio Pineda - Alejandro Rasteletti - Valentina Alarcon 6 Comments


There is an urgent need to reduce labor informality to encourage inclusive growth after the pandemic is over in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). Labor formality boosts government revenue and targeting of transfers, increasing productivity and curtailing poverty.

Given that the region has one of the highest labor informality levels in the world, targeting informality is essential. Before the pandemic struck, between 50%-60% of LAC workers (some 150 million people) had informal jobs. Only Sub-Saharan Africa was in a more critical situation (Figure 1). Even in countries with lower levels of informality, such as Chile, Uruguay, or the Bahamas, it was still around 30% (Figure 2), twice as much as in Western and Southern Europe (14.3%).

Figure 1: Informal labor as a percentage of total employment in 2016

Figure 1: Informal labor as a percentage of total employment in 2016
Source: Prepared by the authors based on data supplied by the ILO.

The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated the problem by bringing about across-the-board job losses, especially considering that most of the recovery of employment  is  expected to be through informal jobs. Therefore, today more than ever it is vital to implement reforms to recover employment by boosting formalization in Latin America and the Caribbean. These reforms should zero in on low-income workers, who are the most vulnerable segment in LAC, labor informality among the lowest income decile accounts for 80% of all workers (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Non-contributing salaried workers and self-employed workers in Latin America by income quintile (% of paid workers), 2018*

Figure 2: Non-contributing salaried workers and self-employed workers in Latin America by income quintile (% of paid workers), 2018*
Note: *Chile and Suriname (2017), Bahamas and Nicaragua (2014), and Haiti (2012). Source: Prepared by the authors based on data supplied by the IDB/ SIMS, 2020.

Reasons Behind Informality

Although there are diverse factors leading to informality, three main reasons explain why it is so prevalent in LAC. The first one is the low level and deficient quality of human capital in lower-income countries, hindering workers’ entrance into the formal labor market.

The second reason is formal markets’ high non-wage labor costs, which discourage employers from hiring workers legally. In some cases, these high costs are associated with elevated social security contributions and other payroll taxes, representing between 11% and 48% of wages (27.3% on average [1]). Countries that have cut back on these costs have seen positive impacts on formality. For example, Colombia has managed to boost formal labor by 18% [2] after implementing a tax reform in 2012 that reduced payroll taxes by nearly 50%.

The third reason is associated with social welfare programs for workers in the informal sector. These well-intended social programs were developed to bridge an important gap in access to traditional social security, which was only available to formal workers. Many of these transfers were created during the 1990s as non-contributory welfare programs, such as the cash conditioned programs Progresa in México and Bolsa Familia in Brazil.

Although these programs had a positive effect on reducing poverty and inequality, they have an unintended negative impact on job formality – since getting a formal job leads program recipients to forfeit the social transfer, they find little encouragement to join the formal workforce. Therefore, by reducing once and for all the welfare program if the person enters the formal sector formality entails a 100% implicit tax on social benefits.

Several empirical studies corroborate the negative effect of this implicit tax embedded in the loss of the non contributory social program by entering the formal sector. In developed countries, where informality levels are low, social welfare has a negative effect on labor force participation – i.e., on people’s decision whether to work or not. In LAC countries, where informality is pervasive, recent literature has shown that the impact of non-contributory programs on employment was not so much on the choice whether to work or not, but on the choice of formal or informal work [3]. For example, the introduction of the non-contributory program Family Allowances (AFAM, its Spanish acronym) in Uruguay led to an 8 percentage point drop in formal employment, due mostly (about two-thirds) to an increase in informal employment [4].  

Alternatives to Non-contributory Social Programs: Negative Income Tax

Given that the main issue with the welfare programs currently in place in LAC is that they make informal labor more attractive, the big challenge for public and fiscal policy in the region is finding alternative systems with as few side effects and disincentives to formality as possible. At the same time, due to the region’s fiscal fragility, it is important that these alternatives have budgets similar to those already in place, to avoid adding additional fiscal pressure. They should also be capable of reducing poverty as much as existing cash conditioned programs do, so progress in this area is not lost.

To identify these alternative systems, we must keep in mind that any welfare program focused on redistribution will disincentivize employment to some extent. However, not every alternative is equally distortive. Some options, such as the Negative Income Tax (NIT) or the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) programs, generate fewer distortions or disincentives than traditional non-contributory welfare programs.

This is why the NIT and EITC systems are the best choice for LAC to rely on formal “workfare” programs that reward formal workers, as opposed to the current social “welfare” systems that encourage them to informality and  punish formalization.

The key to formal workfare programs is that total compensation for formal work (made up of both the worker’s formal wage plus the refundable tax credit) increases with the employee’s formal income.

One of these formal workfare systems is the NIT. In this system, program beneficiaries who are not working or are employed informally receive the minimum  guaranteed compensation (for example the amount of the conditional cash transfer). The main difference between the NIT and traditional social welfare programs is that under the NIT, when a person gets a formal job, the benefit is not stripped completely; rather, it is gradually reduced as the employee’s wage increases. In this arrangement, transfers to a person who gets a formal job would decrease, for example, by only 50%, making their net income higher if formally employed, therefore rewarding formality. As the worker receives a higher wage, the  refundable tax credit is gradually reduced to the point where the employee can start paying income tax.

A numerical example is particularly useful to depict this scheme. Suppose an NIT program offers a guaranteed income of $2,000 for unemployed people. If this program’s benefits are cut to 50% of a person’s wage, anybody with a salary under $4,000 in the formal labor market would receive an NIT between $1 and $2,000 [5]. If the worker earns $1,000 for their formal job, the benefit they would obtain through the NIT would be $1,500 ($2,000 – 50%*$1,000), adding up to a net income of $2,500. If this same person decided to work less and only earn $500, for example, the NIT would contribute $1,750 ($2,000 – 50%*$500). Although this amount is higher, the worker’s net income would only add up to $2,250, making the employee’s net income lower if they choose to work less.

Earned Income Tax Credit Program

The initial proposal of negative income tax inspired the successful Earned Income Tax Credit program, introduced in the United States in 1975. Although the general principle of the EITC is the same as that of the NIT, the difference lies in that in the case of low-income wages, the transfers that the employee receives from the government increase proportionally to their salary. Once the level of income is high enough, these transfers stop growing and eventually decrease, progressing to zero.

EITC has become the fastest-growing pro-employment and antipoverty policy in the US. It has also reached the largest number of beneficiaries, reaching some 28 million workers. Despite the program’s relatively large scope, it has a low cost. The budget allocated to EITC reached US$64.9 billion in 2018 or 0.32% of the country’s GDP.

There is an overwhelming consensus in the literature that EITC has many positive effects. Among them, the program increases labor force participation, especially for single mothers, the group that was previously mostly discouraged from working [6]. Positive effects have also been reported regarding poverty reduction because the program rewards employment and subsidizes the income of lower-paid workers.

Studies have found that in 2018, EITC pulled 5.6 million people out of poverty, including 3 million children. Another important effect, very relevant to LAC, is that a 10% increase in EITC led to a decline of men’s participation in the informal sector of between 5.8 and 7.3 percentage points, despite increased formality not being one of the EITC’s goals in the United States and other developed countries [7].

EITC is ideally suited for Latin America since 80% of the poorest work informally. It offers a significant subsidy to the poorest workers, with refundable tax credits as long as they are formally employed. This program could also be easily complemented, at least initially, with demand-side subsidies to firms, acting as incentives to generate increased demand for formal employment. This supplementation with demand-side subsidies could be meaningful, given that the demand for low-skilled — and therefore, low-income — workerstends to be low.

Aside from these clear advantages in increasing formal employment, programs such as the EITC and the NIT have other benefits worth mentioning. On the one hand, they reduce dependency and stigmatization as compared to traditional welfare programs. This is because they offer benefits within the income tax system. Therefore, these programs are managed by tax agencies, which also significantly cuts administrative costs. For example, in the United States, the administrative cost of EITC is 0.5% of the benefit, while the administrative costs of traditional welfare programs usually reach up to 16% of the benefits [8].

Another advantage shared by EITC and NIT is that they make the income tax progressive by integrating lower-income deciles to those affected by the tax, who receive negative tax rates (equivalent to wage subsidies). Another advantage is that these programs’ benefits are automatic and leave little room for eligibility manipulation by politicians, making them less vulnerable to corruption by clientelism, which might take place with conditional cash transfers.

Analyzing the potential benefits of the NIT in Latin America and the Caribbean: Women, the Main Beneficiaries

As a consequence of all the previously mentioned advantages, many countries have implemented refundable tax credit programs on earned income. Among the at least 18 developed countries that have implemented these programs are Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Korea, with budgets ranging from 0.3% to 2.1% of their GDP. These programs display interesting differences among countries, such as being based on individual, not family income, with a higher or lower incidence of the number of children on the benefit received; and more or less working hours required. This flexibility, a product of each country’s experience, provides alternatives and lessons learned that can be adapted to the various realities of Latin American and The Caribbean countries.

Other alternative and popular systems such as a Universal Basic Income (UBI) that gives a unique transfer for all individuals independent of their income, would be prohibitively expensive for the region, unless they are paired with deep cuts in other social security programs and public expenditures, making the  NIT and EITC more attractive choices. In LAC (population: 650 million), a UBI of US$3.2 per day (covering the poverty line of low middle income countries)  or US$96 per month would cost around US$748 billion yearly, or about 60% of total federal public spending, or 24% of GDP. Instead of granting everybody US$96 per month, an NIT program with a 50% tax rate would provide the same transfer to the extreme poor and also to people whose monthly earnings were under US$192, at only a fraction of the UBI cost.

To explore the possible impacts of introducing an NIT in LAC countries, we conducted simulations using data from income and spending surveys in Argentina, Colombia, Uruguay, Brazil, and Mexico. The scenarios considered implementing a 50%-rate NIT, maintaining a guaranteed minimum income for the first quintile similar to that offered by each country’s cash transfer program. The NIT was applied to the second quintile, allowing informal workers who were receiving non-contributory cash transfers to access a larger benefit, as long as they entered the formal labor market. To reach results that could be compared among countries, it is assumed that they each allocate a moderate budget equivalent to 0.5% of their GDP.

Introducing an NIT with the aforementioned characteristics could lead to a potential formalization rate of 57% among informal workers in the second quintile alone [9]. In other words, 6.3 million workers could move from the informal sector to the formal labor market in these five countries [10] (Figure 3). Additionally, since women are one of the groups most affected by the pandemic, this system is especially beneficial to them, due to the fact that in every country considered for the simulation, the potential formalization rate for women is higher than that of men. The formalization rate of 57%,  was indeed  71% for women and only 47% for men.

Figure 3. Potential formalization rate with a 50%-rate NIT and a budget equal to 0.5% of GDP

Source: Prepared by the authors based on findings.
Source: Prepared by the authors based on findings.

As previously mentioned, the implementation of programs like the NIT should, at least initially, be accompanied by measures to support labor demand, so the latter can adapt to a rise in supply. Examples of such formal labor demand support measures include reducing non-wage labor costs and payroll taxes charged to companies for hiring low-income workers, which would stimulate the creation of formal jobs [11].   

Unique Opportunity to Foster Formalization and Productivity

The results of the Negative Income Tax (NIT) and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) programs reveal that there are policies that can be put in place in Latin America and the Caribbean to increase labor formalization and break the vicious cycle of inefficiency and inequity in public spending and tax evasion. This loop is keeping the region’s productivity at low levels, hindering growth rates, and favoring inequality.

Implementing these programs will require a transition from the current system to an EITC, NIT, or a combination of the two. This process will depend on each country’s characteristics and its social and tax policies. The first step is to define which programs will be substituted, the speed of replacement, and the eventual need to provisionally maintain some non-contributory programs.

In the medium term, due to the positive effect on behavior, a higher formalization rate could lead to the program financing by itself, and even using less budget for a given reduction in poverty. It can take years to adapt these labor income tax credit systems to the realities of LAC. Nonetheless, they are some of the best tools to achieve labor formalization and should be considered in the region’s structural reform agenda to promote recovery after the pandemic.

 

Notes:

This blog entry is based on the report “Fiscal Policy and Management to Increase Formalization,” Pessino, C. E. Pineda. A. Rasteletti & V. Alarcón, to be published shortly by the IDB.

[1] Alaimo, V., Bosch, M., Gualavisí, M., & Villa, J. (2017). Medición de costos de trabajo asalariado en América Latina y el Caribe.  Inter-American Development Bank.

[2] Fernández, C., and L. Villar. 2017 “The impact of lowering the payroll tax on informality in Colombia.”      Economía 18, No. 1.

[3] Levy, 2008; Gasparini, Haimovich & Olivieri, 2009; Camacho, Conover & Hoyos, 2009; Bosch & Campos-Vázquez, 2010; Amarante, Manacorda, Vigorito & Zerpa, 2011; Bosch & Manacorda, 2012; Antón, Hernández & Levy, 2012; Garganta & Gasparini, 2015; Bérgolo & Cruces, 2020.

[4] Bérgolo, M. and G. Cruces, 2021 “The anatomy of behavioral responses to social assistance when informal employment is high,” Journal of Public Economics, Volume 193.

[5] The traditional proposal is a 50%-rate NIT. This means that the program guarantees an income level (called C) for those who are unemployed or hold informal jobs, which is cut to 50% of a person’s wage once they obtain a formal job. This way, the collected NIT is NIT= C – 50% * Y.  If the result of the equation is negative, the NIT is 0. The employee’s net income will be Yn= NIT + Y.

[6] Increasing EITC by US$1,000 leads to an estimated 7.3 percentage point growth on employment, and a 9.4 percentage point drop on families under the poverty line. Hoynes, H. and Patel, A., 2018. Effective policy for reducing poverty and inequality? The Earned Income Tax Credit and the distribution of income. Journal of Human Resources.

[7] Gunter, S., 2013. State earned income tax credits and participation in regular and informal work. National Tax Journal, 66(1).

[8] Eissa, N. and H. Hoynes, 2011.  “Redistribution and tax expenditures: the earned income tax credit.” National Tax Journal 64, No. 2.

[9] This is a potential formalization rate, taking into account all those in the second quintile whose benefits from entering the formal labor market with an NIT are greater than those of remaining in the informal sector. As such, this represents the lower limit, given that it disregards the behavioral effects of workers in the first or higher quintiles, who may also find formalization favorable.

[10] Including the self-employed, the number of potentially formalized workers reaches nearly ten million.

[11] Chile, Peru, and Uruguay developed temporary wage subsidies to recover formal employment during the pandemic as well as for future hires. Chile also developed a permanent incentive to formal employment, offering 2/3 of the subsidy to the employee and the remaining 1/3 to the firm.


Filed Under: Administración financiera y tributaria, Gestión Fiscal, Política fiscal, Taxes, Uncategorized Tagged With: informal, labor

Carola Pessino

Chief Economist of the IDB's Fiscal Management Division. She is currently in charge of coordinating knowledge in fiscal policy and management and has led and collaborated in various fiscal strengthening programs in countries in the region. She holds Master in Economics from CEMA University and a Master and Ph.D in Economics from the University of Chicago. She was Secretary of Fiscal Equity (Deputy Chief of Staff) of the Head of the Cabinet of Ministers in Argentina and member of the Economic Council of Advisers to the Minister of Finance of Argentina between 1996 and 1999. During her tenure in government, she designed important projects such as partnership federal tax system and the design, implementation and management of the first integrated information system for fiscal and social purposes (SINTyS) in Latin America of which she was General Coordinator. She was director of the Department of Economics at the CEMA University; Professor and director of the Center for Poverty Studies of the Torcuato Di Tella University; Professor at Duke University and Visiting Fellow at Yale University and the Center for Global Development. She is the author of dozens of academic papers on tax issues, both on public spending and national and sub-national taxation; in labor and social economy; and in fiscal equity, especially in Latin America, and is co-editor of the IDB flagship publication Better Spending for Better Lives.

Emilio Pineda

Emilio Pineda serves as Chief of the Fiscal Management Division at the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) since September 2019. A Mexican citizen, he has a PhD in Political Economy at the University of Columbia, and a bachelor's degree from the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM). Between 2003 and 2008 he worked as an economist in the Western Hemisphere Department at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), where he was responsible for conducting monetary, fiscal, and debt analysis for the Caribbean. Between May 2008 and June 2012, he worked at the Secretary of Finance in Mexico, where, among others, he was responsible for the monitoring and regulation of subnational debt, the accounting harmonization of states and municipalities, and the tax regime of public enterprises including the Mexican state-owned petroleum company, PEMEX. Between 2012 and 2019, he was a Principal Fiscal Specialist of the Fiscal Management Division at the IDB, where he led programs to strengthen subnational fiscal management in Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay. He has published numerous articles in the field of decentralization, subnational taxation, subnational debt and state-owned enterprises.

Alejandro Rasteletti

Alejandro Rasteletti is a leading specialist at the IDB and is currently in charge of coordinating the knowledge cluster of the Fiscal Management Division. At the IDB he served as a tax specialist for Mexico and Colombia, countries where he led technical dialogue and various fiscal strengthening programs. He was also a country economist for Uruguay. Prior to joining the IDB, he was a consultant in the research department of the World Bank and a consultant for the International Monetary Fund. Alejandro has a PhD in economics from the University of Maryland and has published several articles in books and specialized magazines.

Valentina Alarcon

Valentina Alarcón es economista y posee una maestría en Análisis Económico en la Universidad de Chile. Actualmente trabaja como Consultora de la División de Gestión Fiscal del BID. De manera previa, se desempeñó como Jefa de Gabinete del primer Ministro de Ciencia, Tecnología, Conocimiento e Innovación de Chile y como asesora del Ministerio Secretaría General de la Presidencia. También trabajó en la división de fusiones de la Fiscalía Nacional Económica de Chile. Durante su maestría, fue parte del programa de intership del BID, donde se desempeñó como asistente en la División de Gestión Fiscal.

Reader Interactions

Comments

  1. 부산출장안마 says

    October 22, 2022 at 6:01 pm

    Valuable information. Fortunate me I discovered your website by accident,
    and I’m shocked why this twist of fate did not came
    about in advance! I bookmarked it.

    Reply
  2. http://www.brusvyana.Com.ua/user/sonveil88/ says

    October 26, 2022 at 11:56 am

    I am sure this paragraph has touched all the internet viewers, its really really pleasant
    piece of writing on building up new webpage.

    Reply
  3. trade binary options says

    October 27, 2022 at 4:47 am

    Have you ever earned $765 just within 5 minutes?

    trade binary options

    Reply
  4. canada zovirax acyclovir says

    October 27, 2022 at 12:14 pm

    If you wish for to improve your familiarity simply keep visiting this web page and
    be updated with the most recent news posted
    here.

    Reply
  5. Videos xxx Mexicanas says

    October 29, 2022 at 6:47 pm

    Some STIs, such as herpes, genital warts and pubic lice, may still
    be unfold even if a condom is used.

    Also visit my web page Videos xxx Mexicanas

    Reply
  6. Margaret says

    November 2, 2022 at 5:24 am

    Good post however , I was wanting to know if you could write a litte more on this subject?
    I’d be very grateful if you could elaborate a
    little bit more. Appreciate it!

    Reply

Leave a Reply Cancel reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Primary Sidebar

Follow Us

Subscribe

RECAUDANDO BIENESTAR

Welcome to the blog of the IDB’s Fiscal Management Division. This is the place where we talk about fiscal policy and management at the national and subnational levels in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Search

Recent Posts

  • Electronic Invoicing: A Latin American Innovation with Global Reach
  • Unveiling the Truth: How Sticking to Fiscal Rules Boosts Investment in Latin America
  • How Developing Countries Reduce the Impact of Climate Vulnerability on Sovereign Risk
  • Making Good Macro-Fiscal Forecasts for Medium-Term Fiscal Sustainability: Lessons from International Practice
  • Smart Public Procurement for Better Public Spending in Latin America and the Caribbean

Categories

  • Administración financiera y tributaria
  • Compras Públicas
  • Compras Públicas
  • Decentralization
  • Fiscal Policy
  • Gestión Fiscal
  • Política fiscal
  • Public Spending
  • Taxes
  • Uncategorized

Footer

Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo
facebook
twitter
youtube
youtube
youtube

Blog posts written by Bank employees:

Copyright © Inter-American Development Bank ("IDB"). This work is licensed under a Creative Commons IGO 3.0 Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives. (CC-IGO 3.0 BY-NC-ND) license and may be reproduced with attribution to the IDB and for any non-commercial purpose. No derivative work is allowed. Any dispute related to the use of the works of the IDB that cannot be settled amicably shall be submitted to arbitration pursuant to the UNCITRAL rules. The use of the IDB's name for any purpose other than for attribution, and the use of IDB's logo shall be subject to a separate written license agreement between the IDB and the user and is not authorized as part of this CC- IGO license. Note that link provided above includes additional terms and conditions of the license.


For blogs written by external parties:

For questions concerning copyright for authors that are not IADB employees please complete the contact form for this blog.

The opinions expressed in this blog are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDB, its Board of Directors, or the countries they represent.

Attribution: in addition to giving attribution to the respective author and copyright owner, as appropriate, we would appreciate if you could include a link that remits back the IDB Blogs website.



Privacy Policy

Copyright © 2025 · Magazine Pro on Genesis Framework · WordPress · Log in

Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo

Aviso Legal

Las opiniones expresadas en estos blogs son las de los autores y no necesariamente reflejan las opiniones del Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, sus directivas, la Asamblea de Gobernadores o sus países miembros.

facebook
twitter
youtube
This site uses cookies to optimize functionality and give you the best possible experience. If you continue to navigate this website beyond this page, cookies will be placed on your browser.
To learn more about cookies, click here
x
Manage consent

Privacy Overview

This website uses cookies to improve your experience while you navigate through the website. Out of these, the cookies that are categorized as necessary are stored on your browser as they are essential for the working of basic functionalities of the website. We also use third-party cookies that help us analyze and understand how you use this website. These cookies will be stored in your browser only with your consent. You also have the option to opt-out of these cookies. But opting out of some of these cookies may affect your browsing experience.
Necessary
Always Enabled
Necessary cookies are absolutely essential for the website to function properly. This category only includes cookies that ensures basic functionalities and security features of the website. These cookies do not store any personal information.
Non-necessary
Any cookies that may not be particularly necessary for the website to function and is used specifically to collect user personal data via analytics, ads, other embedded contents are termed as non-necessary cookies. It is mandatory to procure user consent prior to running these cookies on your website.
SAVE & ACCEPT